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I. INTRODUCTION
In states with a distinct culture of property ownership in groundwater,
like California and Texas, finding an approach to sustainable basin
management has been difficult. Although there have been successes, both
states continue to struggle with the looming threat of dwindling groundwater
supplies and the associated impacts. Some basins are on a path to complete
destruction as a result of groundwater mining; in others, intense and
sometimes devastating consequences result from continuous overpumping.1
Although the rules governing groundwater rights in California and
Texas are different, one commonality is that, because groundwater rights
attach to ownership of real property, both states must sometimes confront the
issue of dormant rights, i.e., rights not yet exercised but for which there is a
perpetual expectation of increased pumping.2 Courts and property owners
have been reluctant to support attempts to quantify such rights and indeed
have maintained that such quantification is precluded by the fact that dormant
rights are uniquely associated with water rights that derive from ownership
of real property.3 Yet scientists and policy experts increasingly recognize
1. Alexandra S. Richey et al., Quantifying Renewable Groundwater Stress with GRACE, 51 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 5217, 5225–26 (2015), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2015WR017349/
full (identifying California’s Central Valley as one of the world’s most impacted basins); Samantha Fox,
Groundwater Depletion: Is Texas Draining Its Savings Account?, WATER SAGE, http://www.watersage.
com/blog/list-blog/october-2015/groundwater-depletion-is-texas-draining-its-saving/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2016).
2. See Dormant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that “dormant” means
inactive or latent, as in existing but unexercised). In water law, these rights are sometimes also called
“prospective” or “inchoate,” meaning undeveloped. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc.,
1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., concurring) (stating that the common law rule of capture “entitles
a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of groundwater”); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421
S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (holding that the property owner was
entitled to unlimited pumping from the Edwards Aquifer); cf. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr.
Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 990 (Cal. 1935) (holding that dormant rights could not be defined); Wells A. Hutchins
& Harry A. Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Implications for River Basin Management,
22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 289 (1957) (“A major difficulty . . . is the matter of unused riparian
rights. . . . [T]he water right is neither gained by use nor lost by disuse, future use stands as high as present
use. . . . This right reaches into the indefinite future; there is no time limitation whatsoever.”).
3. See, e.g., Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 152–53 (holding that the property owner was entitled to
unlimited pumping from the Edwards Aquifer); Erica Gies, Battle Wages for California Groundwater
Rights, CLIMATE CENT. (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/battle-for-californiagroundwater-rights-17956 (describing a property owner’s characterization of groundwater rights as
inviolable against government regulation).
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that quantification of these rights is necessary to ensure the continued
viability of heavily pumped groundwater basins.4 Dormant claims to a scarce
supply also create economic uncertainty and risk for all pumpers, including
the landowner who holds those dormant rights.5 Despite this, quantification
is perceived as antithetical to water rights based in property ownership, and
efforts to quantify future rights are routinely met with hostility and claims of
government overreach.6
This issue is ripe for discussion in California and Texas. The California
Supreme Court has concluded that, in the surface water context,
quantification is authorized by the reasonable use doctrine, but California
courts have previously rejected attempts to quantify dormant rights to
groundwater.7 A statute adopted in October 2015 places the issue of
quantification squarely before California courts.8 In Texas, the issue of as-yet
unexercised property rights in groundwater is also simmering, following the
2012 and 2013 declarations of the Texas judiciary that groundwater is owned
“in place,” without the necessity of capture, and that such property-based
rights are considered unlimited prior to state regulation.9
This Article argues that the idea that a land-based right cannot be
quantified is legally incorrect and that the idea of an unlimited right is
illusory.10 This Article further argues that quantification of land-based rights
to groundwater is consistent with the fundamental nature of these rights,
rather than antithetical, due to the physicality of the owned property as a
4. See generally BRIAN GRAY ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., ALLOCATING CALIFORNIA’S WATER:
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM (Nov. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1115BGR.pdf.
5. See Gabe Collins, Blue Gold: Commoditize Groundwater and Use Correlative Management to
Balance City, Farm, and Frac Water Use in Texas, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 441, 442 (2015) (“Texans
should also ask, ‘What good is a right to extract a resource from common pools if every other property
owner with access to the pool also enjoys an “absolute” right to extraction and use?’”); C.-Y. Cynthia Lin
Lawell, Property Rights and Groundwater Management in the High Plains Aquifer 28 (Oct. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Lin/water_temporal_property_rts_paper.
pdf (“If producers are concerned with future profits, they will treat the groundwater as a nonrenewable
resource.”); cf. Justin Gillis & Matt Richtel, Beneath California Crops, Groundwater Crisis Grows,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/science/beneath-california-cropsgroundwater-crisis-grows.html?_r=0 (“You see the lack of regulation hurting the agricultural community
as much as it hurts anybody else.” (quoting Doug Obegi, a lawyer with the Natural Resources Defense
Council)).
6. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 753–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting an
attempt to quantify dormant rights); Mark Meckler, California Laws Restrict Groundwater Use on Private
Land, BREITBART (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/california/2014/09/18/ca-laws-restrictgroundwater-use-on-private-land/.
7. Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 990; Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 753–54.
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 2016).
9. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 828–29 (Tex. 2012); Edwards Aquifer Auth.
v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
10. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2014)
(“A property entitlement to pump an unlimited amount of water, secured against government
regulation . . . is unsustainable and is illusory . . . .”); Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in
the Age of Permanent Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1263, 1309 (2014) (distinguishing between the
available property right as defined by hydrology and the perceived legal status of groundwater).
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depletable common pool resource.11 Limits are an inherent element of the
property right itself, and thus quantification should be part of a property
owner’s expectations.12 Moreover, although protests to quantification are
typically based on the rhetoric of protecting individual rights to groundwater,
recognition of these inherent limits increases predictability and certainty, and
thus tends to enhance the value of property rights in
groundwater.13 Ultimately, this Article demonstrates that waste and
destruction of a common pool resource are not part of the land-based right,
and that the exercise of that right may be regulated and quantified to avoid
these outcomes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ownership of Real Property Is Special
Among all of the rights to property, ownership of land is special. Like
Scarlett O’Hara and her “red earth of Tara,” people have a strong
psychological connection to land.14 Emotional ties to water rights connected
to property appear to be just as deep, and anecdotal evidence suggests that
the connection may be even stronger for groundwater than for surface
water.15 One can imagine several reasons for this. First, there is the physical
11. See infra Part III.B–C.
12. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise of the Absolute Dominion Doctrine for
Groundwater, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 291, 312 (2013) (referencing “the general limitation on
all use of property [including water rights under absolute ownership] embedded in the law of nuisance”
(quoting State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 343–48 (Wis. 1974))); Dave Owen,
Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 294 n.247 (2013) (describing a natural law theory under
which a property right in groundwater is elevated above both its economic value and political control, and
ultimately rejecting the theory as rhetorically powerful but with an uncertain doctrinal foundation).
13. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., REPORT 361: 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 14 (William F. Mullican, III & Suzanne Schwartz eds., 2004),
https://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/R361/R361.pdf (“Quantification
of groundwater rights is helpful, if not essential, to effective marketing of groundwater.”); Ronald Kaiser
& Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in
Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 258 (2001) (describing the economic consequences of pumping without
regard to aquifer limits); Lawell, supra note 5.
14. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property
Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 714–
16 (2008) (noting that “subjective value” associated with private property is often higher than market
value due to psychological ties to property); cf. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological
Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609, 638–39 (2009) (“[P]hysical property may affect the
legal system through its own influence on human psychology.”). Scarlett O’Hara is the heroine of the
Pulitzer Prize winning novel Gone with the Wind by Margaret Mitchell (published 1937) and the 1939
blockbuster film of the same name produced by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Tara is the name of the O’Hara
family plantation, and there are numerous references throughout the book and film to Scarlett’s emotional
connection to the property and its “red earth.”
15. See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, In California, Farmers and Senior Water Rights Under Siege, REC.
SEARCHLIGHT (June 5, 2015), http://www.redding.com/news/in-california-farmers-and-senior-waterrights-under-siege-ep-1121832616-353450291.html (describing farmers’ strong ties to water rights);
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fact that surface water can be seen moving off the property, but groundwater
lies hidden, perceived as a personal storage tank, a seemingly perpetual
resource.16 Second, groundwater resources have a strong connection to
farming, ranching, and other agricultural activities that deepen the connection
between property owners and land.17 Although some might argue that the
rhetoric is less personal and more economically motivated, there is no
question that some farmers have a strong, family-connected, legacy-focused
emotional tie to their property rights, including their water rights.18 And in
fact, whatever the motivation, governments in California and Texas have
tended to exercise much earlier and stronger regulatory authority over surface
water systems as compared to groundwater.19 Groundwater regulation
continues to be spotty or nonexistent in key areas, particularly agricultural
areas, and is heavily dominated by property-rights rhetoric.
B. Groundwater as a Common Pool Resource
Groundwater is one of the most recognizable examples of a common
pool resource, consisting of a core resource and limited extractable “fringe
units.”20 The fringe units can be consumed but the core resource must be

Mark Lubell, Water Psychology: Please Lie Down on My Couch, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y & BEHAV.
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://environmentalpolicy.ucdavis.edu/node/341 (describing emotional connections to
drinking water); Conflict in Klamath, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 29, 2001), https://www.splcenter.org/
fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2001/conflict-klamath (detailing protestors who used chain saws and
blow torches to open gates and release irrigation water held back by the federal government, and siphoned
water around head gates and into farm canals until federal marshals were called); cf. Paul Conable, Equal
Footing, County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVTL. L. 1263, 1264–65 (1996)
(describing conflict between local and federal governments over western land, as during the Sagebrush
Rebellion); Nancy Langston, Opinion, In Oregon, Myth Mixes with Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/opinion/in-oregon-myth-mixes-with-anger.html?r=0
(describing
the anger of rural property owners regarding federal regulation and ownership of land in the West); Tay
Wiles, Malheur Occupation, Explained, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/
articles/oregon-occupation-at-wildlife-refuge (noting the connection between the recent armed occupation
of federal land in Oregon and anger about perceived invasion of rights to land).
16. See Amy Hardberger, World’s Worst Game of Telephone: Attempting to Understand the
Conversation Between Texas’s Legislature and Courts on Groundwater, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 257, 267
(2013).
17. See, e.g., id. at 262 (noting that in 2008, 80% of Texas groundwater was pumped for irrigation
purposes); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903) (describing the importance of groundwater to
agriculture).
18. See Krieger, supra note 15.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 109, 125 (1990); see also Christopher R. Brown & Blake Farrar, A Hole in the
Bucket: Aspermont’s Impact on Groundwater Districts and What It Says About Texas Groundwater
Policy, 39 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5, 34 (2008) (citing Donald H. Negri, The Common Property Aquifer as a
Differential Game, 25 WATER RESOURCES RES. 9, 9-15 (1989)) (analyzing groundwater as a common
pool resource); Alan E. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible
Resources, 18 UCLA L. REV. 855, 855 (1971) (describing groundwater as a classic common pool
resource).
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protected to allow for continued consumption.21 An individual’s use of a
common pool resource extracts benefits that then become unavailable to
others.22 For purposes of this Article, “sustainability” is defined as protection
of this core resource for continued consumption, as opposed to depletion the
resource entirely.23
The common pool resource of groundwater is not necessarily, or even
typically, equated with a legal system of common property or community
ownership.24 A common pool resource may be governed by a range of legal
and institutional structures, including private property law, government
regulation, community-based rules and norms, or some combination of
these.25 A common pool resource is also not necessarily the same as the
“commons,” defined as open-access natural resources used by individuals in
the absence of government regulation, although specific groundwater
systems may approximate commons.26
For natural resources such as groundwater, the common pool may be
renewable or depletable.27 Depletable (alternatively, exhaustible) means that
the resource is nonrenewable so that use will eventually lead to destruction
of the resource.28 Nonrenewable resources are characterized by limited
supply, typically because replenishment only occurs over the long-term;
21. OSTROM, supra note 20.
22. Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources, ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2008), http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/JulyAugust%202008/ostrom-full.html.
23. This Article focuses on minimal levels to sustain the resource itself and does not address the
broader meaning of sustainability, under which decision-makers are concerned with varying degrees of
economic, environmental, and equitable values for present and future generations. See, e.g., Dan Tarlock,
Do Water Law and Policy Promote Sustainable Water Use?, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 642, 644 (2011).
These broader considerations are critical for quantification determinations but irrelevant to the question
whether a land-based right fundamentally precludes quantification.
24. Ostrom, supra note 22.
25. Id. Even in mixed systems involving some government or public ownership interests,
groundwater is often connected to the rhetoric of individual rights. Nicholas Brozović, David L. Sunding
& David Zilberman, Optimal Management of Groundwater over Space and Time, in FRONTIERS IN
WATER RESOURCE ECONOMY 2 (2006), http://are.berkeley.edu/~sunding/ brozovic_groundwater.pdf.
26. Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. COMMONS 9, 12
(2011).
27. Friedman, supra note 20 (describing groundwater as an exhaustible resource); Tom Gleeson et
al., The Global Volume and Distribution of Modern Groundwater, 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 161 (2015)
(concluding that most groundwater is nonrenewable because less than ten percent of groundwater is
replenished and renewed within a “human lifetime” of fifty years).
28. See, e.g., James Sweeney, Economic Theory of Depletable Resources: An Introduction, in
3 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMY 752 (1993).
Based on the time scale of the relevant adjustment processes, we can also classify resources as
expendable, renewable, or depletable. Depletable resources are those whose adjustment speed
is so slow that we can meaningfully model them as made available once and only once by
nature. Crude oil or natural gas deposits provide prototypical examples, but a virgin
wilderness, an endangered species, or top soil also can well be viewed as depletable resources.
Renewable resources adjust more rapidly so that they are self renewing within a time scale
important for economic decisionmaking.
Id.
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short-term heavy use will result in “mining” the resource until nothing is
left.29 Coal and natural gas are examples of depletable resources.30
Renewable resources, in contrast, replenish naturally and over relatively
short periods of time.31
Groundwater that recharges naturally is, in one sense, a renewable
resource.32 However, groundwater recharge is highly variable depending on
geography.33 In many instances the natural recharge is so slow that the
resource is essentially depletable from a human perspective, at least absent
artificial recharge.34 Due to a lack of effective regulation, groundwater in
many basins is being pumped at rates much higher than natural recharge.35
In these basins, the groundwater resource is at risk of being left practically or
physically unusable; other basins may reach this state without adequate
controls.36 Because it is these basins and their physical vulnerability with
which this Article is concerned, this Article refers to groundwater as a
depletable resource, with the caveat that individual basins may be arguably
renewable and other basins are potentially renewable given appropriate
management and favorable hydrologic conditions (i.e., lots of rain and snow).
C. What Are Land-Based Rights and What’s So Special About Them?
Although water allocation rules vary significantly between states, as a
general matter, water rights can be divided into two general categories:
(1) rights acquired and exercised by virtue of ownership of real property
(land-based rights) and (2) rights that depend on application of water to
beneficial use (use-based rights).37 Some states recognize only land-based
rights, some states recognize only use-based rights, and some have created

29. Id.; Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13 (describing groundwater mining).
30. Sweeney, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See generally BRIDGET R. SCANLON ET AL., GROUNDWATER RECHARGE IN TEXAS (2000),
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/environqlty/vadose/pdfs/webbio_pdfs/TWDBRechRept.pdf.
34. E.g., Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of International
Groundwater Policy Along the United States–Mexico Border and a Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2004) (citing DAVID KEITH TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 13, 15–16
(2d ed. 1980)) (describing geological variation in groundwater renewability); Review of World Water
Resources by Country, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, (2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005
/y4473e/y4473e06.htm (describing how water resources can be renewable or nonrenewable depending
on management); see also Jane Braxton Little, The Ogallala Aquifer: Saving a Vital U.S. Water Source,
SCI. AM. (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-ogallala-aquifer/ (noting that
scientific consensus is that the Ogallala Aquifer would take approximately 6,000 years to recharge
naturally).
35. See Little, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282–88.

726

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:719

new versions of each kind of right that incorporates elements of the other.38
A few so-called hybrid states like California recognize both types of rights.39
A land-based right is an ownership interest in real property that either
(1) is adjacent to surface water, such as a river; or (2) sits on top of a
groundwater basin and may include the right to divert or pump such water.40
This type of right is considered “part and parcel of the land,” i.e., the water
right inheres in the soil itself and is more than some other type of property
right like an easement or other appurtenance.41
Land-based rights may be called by different titles depending on the
source of the water. When the source of water is surface water such as a
river, creek, stream, or lake, these rights are referred to as “riparian.”42 The
word riparian has its roots in the Latin term ripa, which means bank; i.e.,
these rights exist when property includes the banks of rivers.43
Land-based rights also extend to groundwater located beneath the
surface of the property.44 When the source is groundwater, land-based rights
do not have a consistent nomenclature. In states where there are no
contrasting use-based rights, land-based rights are simply referred to as
groundwater rights or pumping rights.45 In California, land-based rights to
groundwater are called “overlying” rights, referencing the fact that the rights
exist where property overlies, or sits on top of, a groundwater basin.46
In contrast to land-based rights, use-based rights are created when water
is applied to a beneficial use.47 Beneficial uses vary by state and over time,
but the idea generally refers to an activity that has social value, such as
drinking water and other household needs, industry, agriculture, recreation,
hydropower, fish, wildlife, and ecosystems.48 Under the common law, the
physical act of applying water to beneficial use was sufficient to establish the
right.49 With regard to surface water, in most states, an application must
38. See id. at 288, 299.
39. See id. at 284.
40. See id. at 282–84.
41. See id. at 282.
42. Id. at 282–83. Sometimes, in the case of lakes, the term used is littoral. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D
Waters § 33 (2013) (defining “littoral rights” as rights that inhere in property contiguous to a lake or sea).
43. E.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA.
L. REV. 539, 555 n.75 (2004) (citing Johnson v. McCowen, 348 So. 2d 357, 360 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)).
44. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903); Houst. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279,
280–81 (Tex. 1904); Acton v. Blundell [1843], 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (noting “that the person who
owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and
pleasure”).
45. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282–83.
46. See id.
47. E.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920 (1998) (“Beneficial use, without waste, is the
basis, measure, and limit of a water right.”).
48. Id. at 926–28.
49. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282.
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typically be filed before water can be used; the grant of an application confers
an inchoate right that is developed (or “perfected”) by diligence in physically
diverting the water and putting it to beneficial use.50 Some state permitting
systems, like California’s, recognize the continued validity of common law
rights to surface water that pre-date the permit requirement, and therefore,
both common law and permit-based rights exist side-by-side.51
In the groundwater context, the concept of use-based rights is more
complex. In some states, landowners may pump groundwater from overlying
land and use it away from the overlying land without affecting the nature of
the water right.52 In other states, the use of water off-tract changes the nature
of the right, transforming a land-based right into a use-based right.53 Other
states have adopted a use-based system for all groundwater pumping.54
In their classic common-law forms, land-based rights and use-based
rights are governed by fundamentally different principles. These differences
illustrate the unique nature of land-based rights and why they are considered
special and valuable.55 The following four sections describe the most
fundamental differences of the common-law principles.
1. Perpetual
Unlike a use-based right, a right based in property ownership is not
forfeited for non-use.56 A property owner with otherwise intact land-based
rights to water can choose to keep her acreage undeveloped for 100 years but
may initiate pumping at any time. From this perspective, such rights exist in
perpetuity; the rights do not depend on use for their existence or continuing
validity.57 In contrast, for use-based rights, beneficial use is the “basis,
measure, and limit,” and failure to actually apply water to some socially
acceptable purpose means that either the right never existed (failure to
perfect) or that it has been lost (forfeited).58

50. Id. at 283.
51. CAL. WATER CODE § 1202 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.) (excluding vested common-law appropriative rights from the permitting system).
52. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 261–68 (surveying U.S. groundwater rights systems).
53. See id.; see also WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 455–58 (1956)
(discussing use-based rights to groundwater in California).
54. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 268.
55. Land-based rights also have limits. Classic riparian rights, for example, are generally limited to
use on parcels contiguous to the surface watercourse, wherein the parcel’s legal boundaries also serve as
riparian boundaries, and to that portion of the contiguous parcel that is within the watershed of the relevant
watercourse. Land-based rights to groundwater are sometimes similarly limited, with the boundaries for
use drawn around that portion of the parcel that overlies the groundwater basin.
56. Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 921–24 (Cal. 1884). A land-based right may be deliberately
extinguished by deed or contract. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 287–90.
57. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 291.
58. Id. at 286–87 (describing forfeiture); see Millview Cty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 749–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (describing the rules requiring perfection of
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2. Shortage Allocation
Another core feature of water rights centers around allocation of water
during times of shortage. Riparian rights are typically correlative, i.e.,
compared to each other they have equal priority.59 Under correlative
principles, riparian right holders may each take a proportional share of the
available supply, provided the water is used reasonably; during a shortage,
riparian right holders must “share the pain” of drought.60
In California, the formal rule for shortage allocation of overlying rights
is correlative as between each other, and priority as against appropriators, but
appropriators can gain priority via prescriptive rights if they are pumping and
overlying users are not.61 In Texas, unless a special district has jurisdiction,
the law of the biggest pump controls shortage allocation.62 The remainder of
the United States is divided among five general groundwater doctrines.63
The experience of shortage is different in the groundwater versus
surface water context because groundwater basins are, in essence, storage
reservoirs.64 This means that groundwater basins can provide a valuable
water supply when surface water is in short supply.65 A groundwater basin
in constant decline during a series of wet and dry years is said to be in a state
of overdraft, which occurs when pumping exceeds recharge on a long-term
basis and the basin experiences adverse effects such as subsidence and
decreased water quality.66
Whether surface water or groundwater, rights based on beneficial use
typically operate according to the principle of priority, under which the first
water user to start the process of putting water to beneficial use is the “senior”
and may take as much water as needed before the next water user in time (the
appropriative rights and forfeiture); Neuman, supra note 47, at 926–38 (describing the doctrine of
beneficial use).
59. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955); Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror,
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284.
60. Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 411–12 (Cal. 1944); Pleasant Valley Canal Co., 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 24.
61. E.g., City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 501–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
62. Dylan O. Drummond et al., The Rule of Capture in Texas—Still So Misunderstood After All
These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 53 (2004) (referencing Texas’s “law of the biggest pump”).
63. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 277–78; see Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on
Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 269–310 (2013) (describing the five doctrines and the
principles followed in each state).
64. See Drought & Groundwater, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://ca.water.usgs.
gov/data/drought/groundwater.html.
65. E.g., Drought Impacts, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://ca.water.usgs.gov/
data/drought/drought-impact.html (“Unlike the effects of a drought on streamflows, groundwater levels
in wells may not reflect a shortage of rainfall for a year or more after a drought begins. Despite reduced
availability, reliance upon groundwater often increases during drought through increased groundwater
pumping to meet water demands.”).
66. E.g., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER: BULLETIN 118 96 (2003),
http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/california’s_groundwater__bulletin_118_-_
update_2003_/bulletin118_entire.pdf.
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“junior”) may take any.67 In its classic form, this priority system contrasts
sharply with the land-based correlative duty to share the pain of shortages.68
In hybrid systems that recognize both land-based and use-based rights, such
as California, land-based rights as a class may have priority over use-based
rights.69 For example, with respect to surface water, in California, riparian
and overlying right holders are typically senior to appropriators.70
3. Quantity
Land-based rights are not fixed in quantity.71 In Texas, the right holder
may divert or pump as much as she can use without waste; in California, the
right holder may divert or pump as much as can be reasonably used on the
property to which the right is attached.72 Appropriative rights, in contrast,
are tied to a specific quantity of water.73
4. Dormant Priority
In California, a dormant land-based right to groundwater retains priority
over other land-based rights and actively pumping appropriators, meaning
that when the land-based right is exercised, it displaces existing uses.74 Even
in Texas, where there are no appropriative rights to groundwater, the exercise
of dormant land-based rights is disruptive because new uses do not have to
respect or give way to existing uses.75
The combination of the above special attributes of land-based rights
renders the exercise, or even the potential exercise, of dormant rights hugely
disruptive to existing users.76 Where dormant rights remain unquantified,
67. HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 132.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 62–63.
70. Id. at 62–63, 441–42 (discussing surface water and groundwater).
71. E.g., Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284.
72. E.g., id.; Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV.: TEX. WATER, http://texaswater.tamu.edu/
water-law (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing five exceptions to the rule of capture).
73. E.g., Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 23–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284–85.
74. See Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 666
n.10 (Cal. 1979) (“As against an appropriator, a riparian owner is accorded a fixed priority of right. But
the quantity of water to which the right attaches remains unfixed. Thus, an expanded riparian use has the
potential to preempt an inferior appropriative right where the supply [of] water originally was sufficient
to satisfy both uses.” (quoting WATER REVIEW COMM’N, GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW
CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978))); Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco,
90 P.2d 537, 548 (Cal. 1939); Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 986 (Cal.
1935); Pleasant Valley Canal Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28 (“[U]ntil the riparian needs the water, the
appropriator may use it, thus, at all times, putting all of the available water to beneficial uses.”); see also
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (discussing why water must be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible).
75. See infra Part II.D.
76. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 494–95 (Cal. 1935); Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2,
at 289–90.
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basin management is uncertain, and existing users cannot plan or gauge
risk.77 Where unquantified and unplanned-for dormant rights are exercised,
such pumping can substantially upset existing investments.78
D. Land-Based Rights to Groundwater in Texas
In Texas, groundwater is a private property right governed by the
doctrine of “absolute ownership” and the rule of capture.79 The doctrine of
absolute ownership as applied to water is generally attributed to the decision
of an English court in the 1843 case of Acton v. Blundell.80 In that case, the
defendants were miners who sank pits on their land and drained groundwater
away from their neighbor’s property.81 The court held that because the
defendants owned the land, they also had a property interest in the
underground water.82 The court held further that the defendants could not be
held liable for damage to the neighboring well because the ways of
groundwater were mysterious and unpredictable, and therefore, any rule
imposing liability would interfere with resource development.83 This
principle of no liability is referred to as the “rule of capture.”84
Texas adopted the rule of capture and the absolute ownership rule in
1904, citing the same reasons given in Acton v. Blundell.85 Because the rule
of capture provides that a landowner has a right to pump as much
groundwater as she can, regardless of injury to neighboring landowners,
damnum absque injuriâ, Texas water law is sometimes called the “law of the

77. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771–72 (Cal. 1903). Adopting the doctrine of reasonable use,
the court first recognized that “[n]o doubt there will be inconvenience from attacks on the title to waters
appropriated for use on distant lands made by persons who claim the right to the reasonable use of such
waters on their own [overlying] lands.” Id. Second, the court acknowledged that “[s]imilar difficulties
have arisen . . . in surface streams, and must always be expected to attend claims to rights in a substance
so movable as water.” Id.
78. Id.
79. E.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 828–29 (Tex. 2012) (absolute ownership);
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999) (rule of capture); CHARLES R.
PORTER, SHARING THE COMMON POOL: WATER RIGHTS IN THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF TEXANS 40–41
(2014) (discussing absolute ownership and the rule of capture); see Drummond et al., supra note 62, at
51.
80. Acton v. Blundell [1843], 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1223; cf. Jno B. Clayberg, The Law of
Percolating Waters, 14 MICH. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (1915) (noting that some argue that the rule of absolute
ownership for groundwater was decided first in Chasemore v. Richards, (1915) 7 HL 349 (Eng.));
Dellapenna, supra note 12, at 295 (arguing that the 1836 Massachusetts case of Greenleaf v. Francis was
“[t]he first reported common-law case in which the court addressed the problem in terms recognizable as
the absolute dominion doctrine”).
81. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1223–24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1228.
84. Drummond et al., supra note 62, at 53–54 (describing the liability rules associated with the rule
of capture).
85. Houst. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280–81 (Tex. 1904).
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biggest pump.”86 Texas law establishes various exceptions to the principle
of no liability under the rule of capture: trespass, malicious conduct, waste,
contamination, and causing land subsidence through negligent
over-pumping.87
For many years it was unclear whether Texas landowners held a
compensable property interest in groundwater prior to pumping, or whether
the property right in water attached only when the water was brought to the
surface.88 The Texas Supreme Court finally clarified the issue in 2012 in
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day.89 The Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA)
is a political subdivision of Texas charged with managing the groundwater
resources of the Edwards Aquifer.90 Property owners within the EAA’s
jurisdiction applied for a permit to withdraw 700 acre-feet of water per year
for irrigation purposes.91 EAA denied the application, but on administrative
appeal, the property owners were awarded 14 acre-feet per year.92 The
property owners sued EAA for taking their property without just
compensation, as required by both federal and Texas law.93 One issue raised
in the suit was whether the property owners could claim a compensable right
to underground water available to the owners, but not yet pumped by them.94
The Texas Supreme Court took up the case and held that Texas landowners
may assert a right to “groundwater in place,” i.e., groundwater as it sits in the
aquifer prior to pumping.95 In so doing, the Day court confirmed that
property owners in Texas possess an inchoate, unquantified right to future
groundwater supplies—essentially, a dormant, land-based right.96
86. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 1999) (“The rule of capture
essentially allows, with some limited exceptions, a landowner to pump as much groundwater as the
landowner chooses, without liability to neighbors who claim that the pumping has depleted their wells.”);
Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235 (describing the rule of capture as a rule allowing the surface owner to “dig
therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure,” and explaining
the consequences of exercising that right fully, such that the owner “intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in his neighbour’s well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls
within the description of damnum absque injuriâ [(an injury without a remedy)], which cannot become
the ground of an action”); Drummond et al., supra note 62 (citing terms of the law of capture, including
the “law of the biggest pump”).
87. E.g., KATHY WYTHE, TEX. WATER RES. INST., TXH20 28 (2014), http://twri.tamu.edu/media/
574130/web_txh2o_summer2014.pdf (Q&A with Professor Tiffany Dowell); Texas Water Law, supra
note 72 (describing five exceptions to the rule of capture).
88. See, e.g., Marvin W. Jones & Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A
Contrived Battle for State Control of Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 578, 578–79 (2009).
89. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 814 (Tex. 2012).
90. Id. at 818.
91. Id. at 820.
92. Id. at 821.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 821–22.
95. Id. at 817, 832–33.
96. Unlike California, the Texas water right system does not recognize a separate category of usebased rights to groundwater. See id.; HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 132. In other words, Texas property
owners can use groundwater away from the overlying land. In some areas, use may be constrained by the
rules of groundwater conservation districts, which were created in 1985 and today possess broad authority
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E. Land-Based Rights to Groundwater in California
California also recognizes a land-based interest in groundwater for
property owners that overlie a groundwater basin, but relative to Texas,
California adopted very different rules to govern that interest.97 In the 1903
case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court rejected the rule
of absolute ownership in favor of the correlative rights doctrine and the rule
of reasonable use.98 Under the doctrine of correlative rights, no overlying
property owner has priority over other overlying owners.99 The rule of
reasonable use, in turn, provides that property owners may pump
groundwater despite injury to neighbors, as long as the use is reasonable
relative to the injured use and other potential uses of the water.100
Unreasonable use resulting in injury may be enjoined.101
California also recognizes rights in overlying owners to convey
groundwater to non-overlying owners, and in non-overlying owners to pump
from groundwater basins to which they have lawful access.102 However, any
water used upon non-overlying lands is characterized as a use-based,
appropriative right rather than a land-based right.103 Appropriative rights
attach only to surplus water, and ab initio do not include the right to pump
during periods of non-surplus.104 If appropriators pump for five years or
more during overdraft, they may gain priority over unexercised overlying
rights because those active appropriators are said to be invading the rights of
overlying owners.105 This pumping of nonsurplus water may ripen into a
prescriptive right, thereby enabling appropriators to continue pumping during
overdraft.106 However, such prescriptive rights can be denied or limited via
continued pumping by overlying owners during overdraft or in periods of no
surplus, a practice referred to as self-help.107
to regulate groundwater use. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.001–.124 (West 2008 & Supp. 2015).
These districts may issue rules for conserving, protecting, recharging, and preventing waste of
underground water. See id.
97. E.g., City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 (Cal. 2000).
98. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903). The rule of reasonable use adopted by Katz is
distinct from the groundwater doctrine called “reasonable use” in other states, which itself does not adhere
to reasonable use.
99. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 502–04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Wells A.
Hutchins, California Ground Water: Legal Problems, 45 CAL. L. REV. 688, 689 (1957) (“No overlying
owner has priority over any others solely because he used the water first.”).
100. Katz, 74 P. at 771–72.
101. Id.
102. City of Santa Maria, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501; Hutchins, supra note 99, at 690.
103. Hutchins, supra note 99, at 690. In addition, use of overlying groundwater for municipal
purposes is deemed appropriative rather than land-based. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198
P. 784, 791–92 (Cal. 1921).
104. City of Santa Maria, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 502.
105. Id. at 511–12.
106. Id. at 511–13.
107. Id. at 517.
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As a result of the rules developed for overlying (land-based) and
appropriative (use-based) property owners, the general legal scheme for
priority rules in California are as follows: first, overlying rights have equal
priority; second, overlying rights are senior to all appropriative rights; and
third, as between appropriators, the rule of priority applies. The priority of
overlying dormant rights exists as a result of the second rule, plus the fact
that overlying owners do not lose the right to pump water for lack of use.
This means that an overlying owner can initiate new pumping at any time,
even if there is injury to appropriators.108 To take an extreme example, an
appropriator might have been pumping for 100 years, and if a neighboring
property owner overlying the basin decides to plant orchards on the overlying
land, the overlying owner can displace the appropriator even, theoretically,
to the point of taking all of the underground supply from the appropriator.
This formalistic outcome is often modified in practice by the ability of
appropriative rights holders to gain prescriptive rights over dormant
overlying rights, and these prescriptive rights may be quantified during
adjudication.109 Yet prescriptive rights and adjudication do not entirely
resolve the issue of dormant rights to groundwater for several reasons. First,
with luck, California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014
(SGMA) will lead to quantitative, data-driven management at the local level
without the need for adjudication.110 Such management efforts will require
addressing dormant rights.111 Second, even in adjudication, appropriators
may not be able to establish all elements of prescription under specific
facts.112 Finally, the existence of overdraft is not a necessary precondition to
adjudication; as a result, adjudication will not always result in
extinguishment of dormant land-based rights to groundwater through
prescription.113 Thus, the challenge of dormant rights remains.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Quantification of Land-Based Rights: The Ongoing California Saga
As demand for water has increased, the trend toward quantification of
dormant land-based rights has increased as well. Many eastern states
transitioned their land-based rights to permitting systems.114 Of the western
108. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
109. See id. at 747. Not all adjudications result in quantification. See Steve Saxton, The Seaside Basin
Case: Adjudication Grows Up, 191 CAL. WATER L. & POL’Y REP. (2006).
110. See Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720–37.8 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
114. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV.
53, 85 (2011) (“The process of modifying or abandoning traditional riparian rights continues today, with
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states that have retained land-based doctrines, many tend to ultimately
modify their rules to incorporate more aspects of a use-based system.115 This
is due to both physical and economic factors.116 However, in important
agriculture states such as California and Texas,117 some courts—and a great
deal of rhetoric—have thus far held fast to the concept of inviolable dormant
pumping rights.118
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of dormant
land-based rights in Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore
Irrigation District.119 In that case, one irrigation district sought to quiet title
to water rights against another irrigation district in the water-scarce Kaweah
Delta.120 While emphasizing the need to quantify water rights in arid
California, the Tulare court nonetheless held that inchoate rights to water
could not be limited by establishing quantities in the present.121 The court
reasoned that by fixing a definite quantity, the land-based right would lose a
fundamental, definitional element, the loss of which would transform the
right into an (implicitly less desirable) appropriative right.122 The court
explained that to protect the essential value of land-based rights, a trial court
should declare the future water associated with riparian rights senior to any
and all appropriative rights, and retain jurisdiction so that the court could
supervise any new exercise of land-based rights in the future.123
The rule of Tulare was subsequently altered in part by the California
legislature, at least as the rule applies to surface water. At the time Tulare
was decided, controversies over water were typically brought to the court in
many eastern states abandoning classic riparian rights in favor of a new permit system that is based on
riparian, rather than appropriative, principles.”).
115. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 299–300. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Riparian
Rights in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 59–70 (1990) (discussing the theory of a dual system of water
rights in western states).
116. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 299–300. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 115.
117. Farm Income and Wealth Statistics, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/farmincome-and-wealth-statistics/cash-receipts-by-commodity-state-ranking.aspx (last updated Feb. 9, 2016).
In 2014, the top ten agricultural producing states in terms of cash receipts were the following (in
descending order): California, Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, North Carolina,
Indiana, and Wisconsin. Id.
118. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (holding that a property owner was entitled to “unlimited” pumping from the Edwards
Aquifer); Gies, supra note 3; Meckler, supra note 6; Jim Nielsen, California Seeks to Take Farm Water
Rights, SF GATE (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/
California-seeks-to-take-farm-water-rights-5716603.php; Allen Young, Farmers Fight Drought-Inspired
Regulation of Groundwater Pumping, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (July 18, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.biz
journals.com/sacramento/news/2014/07/18/farmers-fight-drought-inspired-regulation-of.html.
119. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 975 (Cal. 1935).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 986.
122. Id. (explaining that the quantity for future riparian uses “cannot be fixed in amount until the need
for such use arises”); see also Seneca Consol. Gold Mines Co. v. Great W. Power Co., 287 P. 93, 98 (Cal.
1930) (“The moment a right in a natural stream is specifically defined in a concrete inflexible amount, at
that moment the right becomes one of priority and not riparian.”).
123. Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 986.
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the form of private lawsuits between individual water users.124 Such
litigation can only bind the parties involved in a suit; given the physical
reality of water as a shared resource, third parties not bound by a ruling could
upset whatever balance had been struck in court.125 Bringing every third
party into court one-by-one as conflicts arose would be overly expensive and
demand excessive space on courts’ dockets.126 To address this issue, in 1943,
California added provisions to the Water Code authorizing the state’s
regulatory body for water rights—now the California State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB)—to conduct a comprehensive adjudication of all
rights to a river or stream system.127 The Water Code provisions contain
extensive notice procedures to ensure that all property owners have the
opportunity to participate.128 In issuing a final decree, the agency is required
to “define the right[s]” by confirming, among other elements, quantities for
all rights on the system.129 Once the agency issues a final decree, it is binding
on all water right holders, and future claimants are estopped from asserting
rights not adjudicated.130
1. California’s Long Valley Decision
The question of how these adjudication provisions would affect dormant
rights rose to the surface in California’s Sierra Valley in Rowland v. Ramelli
(In Re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System).131 In that case, longrunning conflicts in several counties resulted in a comprehensive stream
adjudication at the SWRCB pursuant to the above-described Water Code
provisions.132 An unhappy landowner appealed the decision, in part
challenging the SWRCB’s authority to quantify the dormant elements of his
land-based right.133
124. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 660–61
(Cal. 1979).
125. Id.
126. See Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 553 (Cal. 1939) (“This method of
resolving controversies involving the rights of the users of water on the river is necessarily piecemeal,
unduly expensive and obviously unsatisfactory.”).
127. See CAL. WATER CODE § 2525 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.).
128. Id. §§ 2526–29.
129. Id. § 2769.
The decree shall in every case declare as to the water right adjudged to each party, the priority,
amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and place of use of the water; and as
to water used for irrigation, the decree shall also declare the specific tracts of land to which it
is appurtenant, together with such other factors as may be necessary to define the right.
Id.
130. Id. §§ 2773–74. Decrees issued by the SWRCB in stream system adjudications are appealable
to the California courts. Id. § 2771.
131. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 658–59
(Cal. 1979).
132. Id. at 659.
133. Id. at 660.
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On appeal, the Long Valley court sided with the SWRCB.134 The court
held that quantification of dormant rights is required to fulfill the legislature’s
purpose in enacting the stream adjudication provisions, namely, sustainable
management of the water resource.135 The court did caution that under
constitutional standards, courts must protect the land-based right from total
extinguishment, i.e., a court cannot simply declare that a water right no longer
exists.136 Courts must protect land-based water rights as property rights
consistent with constitutional principles.137 However, the court upheld the
power of the SWRCB to take actions that limit or alter dormant land-based
water rights by fixing the nature, scope, and extent of those rights, as long as
the change does not equate to total extinguishment.138 The court explained
that in areas of scarce water resources, such as in arid California, it is not
reasonable to allow undefined and unlimited rights when they can be
integrated without destroying the entire property right.139 The court
explained its divergence from Tulare and similar cases by reasoning that
there is a difference between piecemeal private adjudication and a
comprehensive statutory adjudication; whereas the former cannot guarantee
due process to a land-based right holder, the statutory adjudication
procedures were specifically designed to provide all required due process via
extensive notice, hearing, and other procedures.140
As a result of Long Valley, California courts may approve a decree that
limits the nature, scope, and extent of unexercised riparian rights to surface
water without violating the takings clause.141 However, as described below,
this rule has not yet been applied to groundwater.
2. The Goleta Court Declines to Apply Long Valley to Groundwater
After Long Valley, the question naturally arose, could dormant
land-based rights to groundwater also be limited? The courts had already
recognized that land-based rights to groundwater are analogous to land-based
rights to surface water, and that generally the same principles should apply.142
The dormant-right question was raised before California’s Second District
Court of Appeal in Wright v. Goleta Water District.143 This case pitted

134. Id.
135. Id. at 660–61, 665–66.
136. Id. at 665.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 664–66.
140. Id.; cf. Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 553 (Cal. 1939) (“[The case-bycase] method of resolving controversies involving the rights of the users of water on the river is necessarily
piecemeal, unduly expensive and obviously unsatisfactory.”).
141. See In re Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 669.
142. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
143. Id. at 743.
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landowners claiming senior rights to groundwater against a special district
water supplier.144 The overlying landowners brought the action against the
water district to determine their relative rights to water in the basin; the
defendant water district cross-complained against other land-based and
use-based water right holders, seeking a determination of the basin’s safe
yield and a decree designed to avoid overdraft.145 The trial court determined
that the existing, exercised rights of the water district and others were senior
to dormant rights of certain land-based claimants, and allocated prospective
rights based on these priority determinations.146
On appeal, the court reversed this determination.147 The appellate court
held that, although the SWRCB may adjust priorities for dormant land-based
rights, this authority does not exist when there are insufficient protections for
property right holders.148 The court noted that the comprehensive stream
adjudication procedures were carefully designed to include certain notice and
other requirements to ensure adequate due process to water right holders, and
that without those standards, a lawsuit could not bind nonparticipating
property owners.149 However, the court left open the possibility that a
comprehensive procedure could be designed for groundwater that would
provide the same kind of protections that are afforded to surface water users
by the Water Code.150
This potential was subsequently discussed with approval by the
California Supreme Court in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.151 In
Mojave, the court considered whether water could be allocated in litigation
according to equitable principles rather than priority.152 The court held that
when fashioning a solution to oversubscription of a water system, a decree
may adjust, but may not wholly disregard, water right priorities.153 In so
holding, the court described Wright, noting that Wright protects dormant
rights, and again signaled the importance of the property right in priority.154
However, in a much-perused footnote, the court mused in dicta that a trial
court could conceivably apply the Long Valley principles to groundwater if
land-based right holders were afforded the same due process protections
provided by the stream adjudication provisions of the Water Code.155 The
court noted that to fulfill the quest to “harmonize water shortages with a fair

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 749–50.
Id.
Id.
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 862–63 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 869.
Id. (citing Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 743, 745).
Id. at 868 n.13.
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allocation of future use,” courts should have some ability to limit future
groundwater use by a land-based right holder.156
3. California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and Dormant
Groundwater Rights
Although California’s failure to manage groundwater basins
comprehensively has been harshly criticized for a long time, reform has been
slow. Concern over the state’s dwindling groundwater resources heightened
between 2007–2014, when the state struggled through an eight-year period
of nearly continuous drought; over that period, the anxieties of long-term
drought and the specter of failing groundwater basins awakened a new
political will.157 Previously unknown coalitions emerged ready to support a
new approach to groundwater management, and in 2014 this creative energy
resulted in the passage of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
(SGMA).158
SGMA is designed to achieve a sustainable allocation of groundwater
in heavily pumped basins by empowering locals to create their own solutions,
continuing California’s long tradition of local management of groundwater
resources.159 SGMA establishes that the state will not step in unless and until
local agencies fail to meet certain planning requirements or fail to achieve
sustainability.160 The Act requires the creation of new local entities, called

156. Id.
If Californians expect to harmonize water shortages with a fair allocation of future use, courts
should have some discretion to limit the future groundwater use of an overlying owner who
has exercised the water right and to reduce to a reasonable level the amount the overlying user
takes from an overdrafted basin.
Id.
157. Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 5–6 (2015); Groundwater
Problems and Prospects, Part 2: The Story Behind the Passage of the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act, MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK (Mar. 19, 2015), http://mavensnotebook.com/2015/03/19/
groundwater-problems-and-prospects-part-2-the-story-behind-the-passage-of-the-sustainablegroundwater-management-act/.
158. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.).
159. Id. § 10720.1(b) (“In enacting this part, it is the intent of the Legislature to . . . enhance local
management of groundwater consistent with rights to use or store groundwater and Section 2 of Article X
of the California Constitution.”); id. § 10720.1(d) (“To provide local groundwater agencies with the
authority and the technical and financial assistance necessary to sustainably manage groundwater.”); id.
§ 10720.1(h) (“To manage groundwater basins through the actions of local governmental agencies to the
greatest extent feasible, while minimizing state intervention to only when necessary to ensure that local
agencies manage groundwater in a sustainable manner.”); see also City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 491, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“There is no statewide system for allocating rights in groundwater.
The Legislature has left that to local government or, as here, to adjudication by the courts.” (citing O.W.L.
Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))).
160. CAL. WATER § 10735.4(c) (stating that the SWRCB) may develop interim plan if local agency
has not addressed deficiency resulting in probationary status); id. § 10735.8 (stating that the SWRCB has
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groundwater sustainability agencies, which will have the power and the
obligation to identify water sustainability objectives for their own
groundwater basin and to adopt a management plan designed to achieve those
objectives.161 The objectives must avoid certain undesirable conditions such
as seawater intrusion and subsidence, and SGMA terms the absence of those
conditions “sustainable yield.”162 Sustainable yield is defined similarly to the
common law “safe yield” standard.163
SGMA as originally enacted did not address the problem left open by
Goleta and Mojave, i.e., whether courts can limit dormant land-based rights
to groundwater.164 This omission was addressed the following year by
Assembly Bill (AB) 1390, a bill that created comprehensive groundwater
adjudication procedures by amending the state’s Code of Civil Procedure.165
Signed by Governor Jerry Brown on October 9, 2015, AB 1390 stated that
courts should interpret the new provision as adding “notice and due process
sufficient to enable a court in a comprehensive adjudication conducted
pursuant to this chapter to determine and establish the priority for
unexercised water rights. The court may consider applying the principles
established in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25
Cal.3d 339.”166 The bill acknowledged that this provision, unlike other
aspects of the bill, may be interpreted to alter groundwater law.167 By
providing these protective due process procedures, AB 1390 attempts to fix
the problem identified by the Goleta court so that courts can quantify
land-based rights to groundwater, including dormant rights.
AB 1390 makes this suggestion only with respect to adjudication, and
does not address whether groundwater sustainability agencies can likewise
limit dormant land-based rights as they attempt to limit pumping to safe yield

authority to adopt interim plans and the content of the plans); id. § 10735.8(g)(1) (stating that the SWRCB
may determine whether sustainability plan will achieve sustainable yield).
161. Id. § 10721(j) (groundwater sustainability agencies (GSAs)); id. §§ 10725–26.9 (powers and
authorities of GSAs); id. § 10721(k) (groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs)); id. §§ 1027–728.6 (GSPs).
162. Id. § 10721(w) (sustainable yield); id. § 10721(x) (undesirable results).
163. See Alfred Smith, Water Rules: California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
Provides a Comprehensive Set of Tools for Local Agencies to Implement Groundwater Management
Plans, 37 L.A. LAW., Feb. 2015, at 18, 23 (referencing the connection between SGMA and common-law
safe yield standards). Compare CAL. WATER § 10721(w) (sustainable yield), and id. § 10721(x)
(undesirable results), with CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA: A
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO WATER CODE SECTION 12924 60 (1980), http://www.
water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/ground_water_basins_in_california_bulletin_118-80_/
b118_80_ground_water_ocr.pdf (describing safe yield as “the maximum quantity of water that can be
continuously withdrawn from a groundwater basin without adverse effect”). Cf. Leahy, supra note 157, at
35 & n.176 (concluding that both standards were ambiguous pre-SGMA).
164. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); Wright v. Goleta Water
Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
165. 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 672 (AB 1390) (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830).
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1
of 2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.).
167. Id.
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under SGMA.168 That issue remains to be addressed either in future
legislation or on a case-by-case basis during the SGMA process.
B. Quantification of Dormant Rights Is Necessary to Protect the Common
Pool Resource of Groundwater
In business circles there is a saying that “you can’t manage what you
don’t measure,” an adage that has been embraced by groundwater
management advocates in California.169 Along these lines, the California
Supreme Court in Long Valley recognized that in the surface water context,
dormant rights create “pernicious effects” and inhibit planning that would
protect the public interest.170 Scientists and policy experts likewise recognize
that quantification is necessary to ensure the continued viability of heavily
pumped groundwater basins.171 In fact, accurate data and quantitative
management have been identified as basic requirements for sustainable
human use of a common pool resource.172 More specifically, studies
demonstrate that successful groundwater management requires quantitative
standards for groundwater levels and individual pumping, combined with
monitoring and enforcement.173 In one example, experts specifically
attributed management success to quantification; in that case, pumping limits
were assigned to all rights in a court adjudication, and post-judgment the
parties were required to report annual pumping to each other in an open and
public process.174 This framework provided protection against excess
pumping by any individual property owner, which in turn protected
everyone’s property interests in the common pool of groundwater.175 The
key was that everyone knew how much the other was allowed to pump, and
that total pumping was set at a level that would quantitatively protect the core
groundwater resource from depletion.176
In California, it might be argued that there is no need to quantify
dormant rights because, when overlying owners are ready to exercise their

168. 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 672 (AB 1390) (West).
169. See Anna North, California’s Big Groundwater Problem, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (July 22,
2015, 2:43 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/californias-big-groundwater-problem/
?_r=0. The concept is often said to originate with management guru Peter Drucker, who allegedly said,
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,” although the Drucker Institute maintains that he “never
actually said it.” Paul Zak, Measurement Myopia, DRUCKER INST. (July 4, 2013), http://www.drucker
institute.com/2013/07/measurement-myopia/.
170. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 661 (Cal.
1979).
171. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4 (recommending quantification of groundwater rights as one of
the top reforms needed to ensure sustainable groundwater).
172. Ostrom, supra note 22.
173. OSTROM, supra note 20.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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rights, the priority system dictates that those land-based uses will simply
displace lower priority appropriators.177 This argument ignores important
factors. First, in reality, later uses do not typically supplant existing uses;
new uses are simply added to existing uses, thus increasing the total demand
on the basin and paving the way toward overdraft. Second, once a
groundwater basin is in overdraft, existing uses may legally supplant
unexercised groundwater rights under the doctrine of prescription.178 In this
regard, quantification of dormant rights can help protect those rights by
allowing landowners to take steps to avoid prescription by appropriative
users, and by correcting the “pernicious effect” that uncertainty about future
pumping has on groundwater management.179
C. Beyond Reasonable Use: Inherent Limits on Private Property Rights in
Common Pool, Depletable Resources
Because the Long Valley court cloaked its decision to quantify dormant
water rights in the authority of the reasonable use doctrine, the analysis does
not, of course, apply in a nonreasonable use jurisdiction such as Texas.180
However, this Article proposes that the Long Valley reasoning is not
exclusive; there is another principle leading to the same outcome, and this
principle applies in all jurisdictions. This more broadly applicable principle
has two components:
(1) As a matter of physical reality, there is an inherent limit on the
quantity of distributable private property rights in a common pool
depletable resource.181
(2) There is no property right to deplete a common pool resource
beyond recovery.182
Under the foregoing, limits on property rights are defined by the nature of the
property itself as a common pool, depletable resource.183 In an overdrafted
or nearly overdrafted basin, unquantified dormant rights are inconsistent with
these limits.184 This Article proposes that honoring these limits requires
quantification of dormant land-based rights, particularly in heavily pumped
basins, based on the following principles:
177. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 664 (Cal.
1979).
178. Id. at 663 n.6.
179. Id. at 662 (describing the negative effects of uncertainty); GRAY ET AL., supra note 4 (explaining
that quantification is critical to protecting groundwater).
180. See In re Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665.
181. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22.
182. See Dellapenna, supra note 12.
183. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22.
184. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22.
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First, available rights are limited by the capacity of the resource.185 The
following example illustrates this concept. Assume that several people hold
individual rights to a blueberry pie. The scope of each individual’s initial
rights is defined by the size of their slice, and the cumulative rights are
necessarily fixed by the size of the pie. Although their individual slices may
not be equal, the cumulative value of their rights cannot exceed the amount
of pie available. If the pie is smaller, at least some shares must get
proportionally smaller.
Second, the property right itself includes an inherent duty to use the
resource so as not to damage the renewability of the resource.186 Here we
must part from the pie example—after all, who wouldn’t want to eat an entire
blueberry pie? But groundwater is property of a different kind, and that
makes all the difference. Groundwater is a common pool, depletable
resource that is critical to human health and safety, environmental and
economic viability, and quality of life.187 For this reason, if not for others,
each individual property right in the common pool resource is impressed with
an inherent obligation to protect the sustainability of the resource against
destruction.188 As explored below, this inherent obligation is arguably
already reflected in existing principles within the general law of property as
well as within concepts specific to water law, including the absence of a right
to destroy common pool resources, the broadly recognized prohibition
against the waste of water, the public trust doctrine, and the sovereign ability
to regulate property by way of the police power.
1. No Right to Destroy
The right to destroy, or jus abutendi, is commonly listed among the
sticks in the bundle of property rights.189 Some scholars take the position that
jus abutendi has not received much treatment in the law beyond its classical
origins and is increasingly treated with hostility in contemporary society.190
Others maintain that the right clearly exists in, and is integrated into,
185. Griggs, supra note 10 (“Candor thus compels us to reconsider the groundwater right itself: in
obedience to the actual hydrological bases upon which the right depends, in accordance with its actual
rather than perceived legal status . . . .”); Fennell, supra note 26, at 13 (discussing how the attributes of a
resource influence property rights).
186. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4.
187. See Fennell, supra note 26, at 13.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards
Property Rights in California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC.
L.J. 1031, 1035 n.13 (1988) (identifying the fundamental attributes of property as jus possidendi, jus
prohibendi, jas utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, and jus disponendi (citing Roscoe Pound, The Changing
Role of Property in American Jurisprudence, 12 UNIV. CHI. CONF. 31, 33–34 (1953))).
190. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 786 (2005) (“In the twentieth
century, the right to destroy fell out of favor, and the most recent literature has argued that such a right, if
it exists at all, should be substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds.”).
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contemporary society, albeit with limits and boundaries.191 Despite their
differences, these scholars agree that when the right does exist, it likely
attaches to those forms of property that have a certain degree of common
value such as works of art, historical properties, cultural resources, and,
notably, land and natural resources.192
It appears that the concept of jus abutendi has not been explored in any
significant way in the context of depletable, common pool resources like
groundwater.193 Yet the logic applies: if the right to destroy personal property
that has substantial common value is limited, then, rationally, the right of an
individual to destroy common resources should also be similarly limited.
This notion should be particularly true when the resource is, like
groundwater, not only economically and environmentally valuable, but also
necessary for communal health and safety.
2. Prohibition Against Waste of Water
The idea that common pool rights are inherently limited commensurate
with the capacity of that common pool is arguably already enshrined in
prohibitions against waste of water found in common law, statutory, and
constitutional authorities.194 Historically, waste has been defined as use in
excess of need and/or use divergent from social norms.195 Judicial and
agency findings of waste typically involve a context-specific analysis,
depending on variables such as water availability, competing demands, and
custom.196 To date, waste is largely a forgiving concept that does not attempt
to force technology or substantially alter the status quo, allowing “a wide
range of acceptable conduct” and censoring only the most egregious
actions.197
And yet—despite the “low expectations” associated with the waste
doctrine—a prohibition against waste must, if it is to mean anything, impose
an expectation that a resource cannot be mined to nothingness. Surely

191. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 293–304 (2014).
192. Id. at 302–04 (describing limits on the right to destroy land and natural resources); see
Strahilevitz, supra note 190.
193. Compare Schulz & Weber, supra note 189 (discussing the concept of jus abutendi), with
OSTROM, supra note 20 and accompanying sources (discussing groundwater as a common pool resource
without reference to jus abutendi).
194. E.g., State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“From an
early date, courts announced the rule that no appropriation of water was valid where the water simply
went to waste.”).
195. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 975 (Cal. 1935) (holding that
flooding fields in winter to kill gophers is a waste of water); Neuman, supra note 47, at 933 (“[W]aste can
be legally defined as the amount of flow diverted in excess of reasonable needs under customary
practices.” (quoting Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L.
REV. 483, 491 (1982))).
196. Neuman, supra note 47, at 933.
197. Id. at 940.
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complete destruction must equate to waste, at least absent a social agreement
to destroy that resource.198 Likewise, because the waste doctrine protects
water resources against (at least some) individual acts of excessive use, then
logically the doctrine must protect the resource against the biggest hit of all,
i.e., destruction of the resource. If, for example, flooding fields to kill
gophers is a waste of water because it renders water unavailable for others,
then the destruction represented by allowing groundwater to be pumped until
the resource cannot be recovered should also be waste. 199
Although judicial decisions do not reflect a strong or assertive waste
doctrine, this does not necessarily mean that the principles of waste are weak
or that a strong doctrine does not or cannot exist.200 The concept of waste is
evolving in the public sphere as science progresses and cultural policies
integrate notions of intergenerational equity.201 Statutes, regulations,
ordinances, and other authorities establishing policies for water use regularly
declare sustainability and the preservation of a resource for future generations
to be a core principle; these pronouncements underscore a connection
between the doctrine of waste and long-term preservation of common pool
water resources.202 From this perspective, it appears that courts may not be
the primary forum for evolution of the doctrine, and therefore one would not
necessarily expect to see the concept evolve in that forum—or, at least, the
next stage of evolution may not have yet reached the courts.203
3. Public Trust
The public trust doctrine is another potential manifestation of a
prohibition against destruction of a common pool resource.204 The public
trust doctrine posits that certain natural resources are held in common by the
people, and that thus there is a duty to make careful choices about the use of
those resources for the benefit of present and future generations.205 Although
there are varying theories about the origin of the public trust doctrine, it is

198. Id. at 933–49.
199. See Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 1006–07.
200. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 47, at 940.
201. See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2231 (2013)
(connecting waste of water resources associated with water being withdrawn faster than natural
replenishment to impacts on human health and intergenerational equity). See generally Edith Brown
Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19
(1992) (describing the concept of intergenerational equity and sustainability in the context of natural
resources).
202. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. 2012) (stating that “regulation must
take into account not only historical usage but future needs”).
203. See Larson, supra note 201, at 2230–32.
204. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 4 (Carolina Acad. Press 2013).
205. See id. (“The [public trust doctrine] requires governmental trustees to manage the resources that
are in the corpus of the trust as a long-term steward for the benefit of both present and future generations.”).
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often said that the principle traces to ancient Roman law, under which the
sovereign had a duty to protect common natural resources including the air,
sea, and seashores.206 The scope of the public trust doctrine as applied to
water resources is determined separately by each U.S. state according to their
individual law and priorities;207 each state independently determines which
environmental resources and values are protected by the doctrine.208
In California, the public trust doctrine has been interpreted to protect the
beds and banks of navigable and tidally influenced waters acquired under the
equal footing doctrine.209 The scope of the doctrine in California is based on
the idea that the public trust is inherently part of the title to federal lands, that
Congress conveyed title to all public lands within each state to each state that
entered the Union, and that this title as conveyed was impressed with the
public trust obligation.210 As a result, the public trust doctrine may be
powerful where it applies but, at least in the California water context, appears
to be limited in application to activities that directly or indirectly affect
navigable and tidally influenced waters.211
Ongoing litigation in California raises the question whether
groundwater pumping that impacts a navigable surface water, the Scott River,
is within the scope of the public trust doctrine; an early decision by a superior
court has held that the doctrine applies.212 In so holding, the superior court
invokes the causal connection between groundwater pumping and surface
water impacts as the basis for its application of the doctrine to
groundwater.213 This reasoning is based on the seminal California Supreme
Court decision applying the public trust to water resources, National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, which held that non-navigable waters are
within the scope of the doctrine when diversion of those waters affect
navigable waters impressed with the trust.214 Notably, under the National
Audubon analysis, the public trust doctrine does not apply absent an impact

206. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (“By the law of nature
these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the
sea.” (quoting Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1)); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–84 (1970).
207. PPL Mon., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234–35 (2012).
208. Id.; Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007);
Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values,
Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010).
209. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 709.
210. Id.
211. Id. But see Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative
State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1122–35 (2012) (concluding that the public trust doctrine has not
independently affected the outcome of environmental conflicts).
212. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014 WL 8843074,
at *7–10 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014).
213. Id. at *8–9.
214. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 720–21.
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on navigable waters.215 As of this writing, the Scott River litigation raising
the issue of application of the trust to groundwater is still pending in superior
court.216 If the court’s determination and reasoning are upheld on appeal,
which seems likely (both the appeal and the upholding), then the outcome
will be that at least certain groundwater basins—basins in which pumping
affects navigable surface water—would be subject to public trust
protections.217 However, basins lacking such connection would not be
subject to the doctrine, at least absent legislative or judicial expansion.218
The public trust doctrine also applies to navigable waters in Texas.219
In this regard, although it is clear that Texas has the power to regulate
groundwater that is held in private ownership,220 Texas courts have not
addressed the application of the public trust to groundwater that is
hydrologically connected to surface water.221 In this and other contexts, the
scope of the public trust doctrine’s application to natural resources in Texas
is still being explored.222
Some scholars argue for a broader conception of the public trust
doctrine, one that would apply the doctrine to every exercise of the
government’s sovereign power over natural resources, not just navigable and
tidally influenced resources.223 Others argue that application of the doctrine
does not depend on title, and that it is instead a function of the sovereign’s
duty to protect the common resources of the people.224 There are a few court
decisions along these lines: In California, one appellate court held that the
doctrine applied to birds.225 In Texas, a district court held that the doctrine
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (“The
water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of
every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every river,
natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the property of the state.”); id.
§ 11.0235 (“The waters of the state are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may be
appropriated only as expressly authorized by law.”); see also Cummins v. Travis Cty. Water Control &
Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.3d 34, 49 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (holding that Texas
Water Code § 11.021 supports application of the public trust doctrine to navigable waters in Texas).
220. See TEX. WATER § 11.021.
221. See id.
222. See Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL
3164561, at *1–2 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Aug. 2, 2012), vacated on other grounds, 438
S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.).
223. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185, 185 (1980).
224. E.g., Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property
Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 520 (1989) (“Indeed, California courts established that this easement exists as a
consequence of state sovereignty; consequently it does not depend on a showing of prior state ownership
of the resource.”).
225. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 606–07 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008). But cf. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (2008)
(“There is doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines—the protection of water resources
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applied to air, a decision that was later vacated on other grounds.226 The state
of Hawaii has adopted a very broad conception of the public trust doctrine,
under which all natural resources are protected for present and future
generations.227 Under these broadest conceptions of the doctrine, the public
trust would preclude “unlimited” pumping rights, the exercise of which
would cause total depletion of groundwater resources.
Another consideration is that, even when the public trust doctrine does
apply, interpretive principles may affect the utility of the doctrine in
protecting common pool groundwater. Under the law of some states, the
public trust doctrine does not automatically require decision-makers such as
agencies or courts to prevent environmental harm.228 For example, in
California, decision-makers determine whether environmental protection is
“feasible” based on a variety of economic, environmental, scientific,
technological, and other factors.229 The California Supreme Court has stated
that, as a matter of practical reality, sometimes water use must be allowed
even when it results in environmental harm.230 And yet, even under an
interpretive standard such as feasibility, which permits some harm to trust
resources in favor of other values, a water use that threatens to entirely
deplete the core resource would, or at least arguably should, tip the scales in
favor of protection.
4. Sovereignty and Police Power
The sovereign and police powers of a state encompass the ability to
regulate for the common health, safety, and welfare, and include the authority
to adopt laws to protect a common natural resource from depletion.231 States
is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . . Nonetheless the duty of government agencies to protect
wildlife is primarily statutory.”).
226. Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1–2 (holding that the public trust doctrine is not limited to
navigable water, but “includes all natural resources of the State including the air and atmosphere . . . ‘the
preservation and conservation of [the] natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public
rights and duties” (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59)).
227. HAW. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (amended 1978).
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall
conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water,
air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the
self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.
Id.; see also id. §§ 3, 7; In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 409 (Haw. 2000).
228. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711–12, 727 (Cal. 1983).
229. Id. at 712.
230. Id. at 727–28.
231. See, e.g., Fall River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 259 P. 444, 449 (Cal. 1927)
(acknowledging that state police power can be invoked to prohibit a use of property that “reasonably
endangers or threatens the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare” (quoting Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W.
759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1925, no writ))); cf. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 7 (discussing police power
of local governments). Professor Joseph Dellapenna suggests that the police power is closely connected
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routinely exercise their power to protect the common resource of
groundwater, whether operating through their legislature or their courts.232
For example, California adopted the idea of managing for “safe yield” in
early groundwater adjudication decisions, a standard that requires
groundwater to be managed so that pumping does not exceed the level at
which the basin can replenish itself over the long term.233 The California
legislature reasserted this power in 2014 by adopting a statewide mandate to
manage for “sustainable yield.”234 Local governments in California may also
invoke the police power to manage groundwater.235 Texas likewise has
repeatedly acknowledged the power of the state to regulate to protect the
health of a groundwater basin, a power that expressly references
quantification.236 Politics aside, these sovereign authorities are, as a matter
of law, sufficient to preclude recognition of claims to private rights to
unlimited pumping sufficient to destroy the groundwater resource; it is
inconsistent for a state to exercise its sovereign authority to regulate to protect
groundwater resources and simultaneously recognize an unlimited private
right to destroy those same resources.
This contradiction raises the question whether, in acknowledging the
impossibility of an unlimited right to pump and/or requiring quantification of
dormant rights, a state would go “too far,” thereby entitling a dormant right
holder to compensation under federal or state takings principles.237 When
groundwater is properly characterized as a depletable common pool resource,
any argument for compensation dissolves; in requiring quantification to
protect the common pool, a state would not be changing property rights to
groundwater—it would simply be acknowledging the physical character of
the resource in which the property right is held. No political or legal rhetoric
can alter the fact that there is physically no such thing as an unlimited
groundwater resource, and thus unlimited rights to groundwater never
to the right of governments to abate nuisances, an act that does not require compensation to the private
property owner whose exercise of rights are limited, and also to the “emergency doctrine,” wherein if two
resources are inevitably going to be destroyed, the government may choose to protect one over the other,
without compensation. Dellapenna, supra note 12. Professor Dellapenna further suggests that these
doctrines are relevant to the question of whether compensation is owed if a government were to clarify
that no private property right to groundwater is unlimited. Id.
232. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 12.
233. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1315 (Cal. 1975); City of Los
Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289, 296–97 (Cal. 1943).
234. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(w) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.) (defining sustainable yield); id. § 10727(a) (“A groundwater sustainability plan
shall be developed and implemented for each medium- or high-priority basin by a groundwater
sustainability agency to meet the sustainability goal established pursuant to this part.”).
235. Baldwin v. Cty. of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 891–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
236. 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 356.10(6) (West 2015) (referencing “[t]he desired, quantified condition
of groundwater resources (such as water levels, spring flows, or volumes) within a management area at
one or more specified future times as defined by participating groundwater conservation districts within a
groundwater management area as part of the joint planning process”).
237. See, e.g., Fall River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 259 P. 444, 448 (Cal. 1927).
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existed. A government cannot take what never existed. Accordingly, a rule
requiring quantification would be squarely within the acceptable bounds of
the police power, and would not equate to a shift of private resources for
public benefit.238 Of course, the question of compensation might arise for an
individual property owner if the defined quantity was substantially
disproportionate to the amount that property owner should reasonably
anticipate in light of the available water supply and the long-term health of
the basin.
D. Is an Inherent Limit Consistent with State Water Rights Doctrines?
1. California
The inherent limits embodied in the proposed principle are consistent
with California’s doctrine of reasonable use and prohibition on waste.
California’s constitution requires that all water resources, including
groundwater, be used reasonably and to the fullest extent possible.239
Allowing the destruction of a resource that could be made renewable with
proper management would not be using water to the fullest extent possible,
over the long term, and would waste that resource. And in fact, the
connection between inherent limits and reasonable use has already been
recognized by the California Supreme Court in the context of surface water
in the Long Valley case, discussed above.240
In the context of California groundwater, some might argue that
quantification is unnecessary because the problem of dormant rights is
already corrected by allowing prescriptive rights to groundwater, which are
generally not recognized in the surface water context.241 However, as
described above, this is not a complete answer to the problem of dormant
rights.242
Others might question why dormant rights are a problem given the
priority system, under which the California rule is that water is taken away
from juniors when seniors demand it. This argument avoids the reality that
juniors are rarely, if ever, curtailed absent a comprehensive adjudication;
instead, pumping continues unabated and overdraft occurs. This curtailment
fails to occur in part due to a lack of central management, and in part because
juniors have developed a reliance on the water that they have been using.243
In this regard, the reliability provided by quantification of pumping rights,
238. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
239. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2.
240. See supra Part III.A.1.
241. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 873–74 (Cal. 1980) (holding there was no prescription against
the state); cf. Brewer v. Murphy, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 444–46 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing a riparian
prescription against another riparian owner).
242. See supra Part III.B.
243. See supra Part II.C.
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including dormant rights, can encourage junior pumpers to invest in a
physical solution; conversely, the lack of quantification may, as a practical
matter, preclude reliability and therefore discourage sustainability-achieving
physical solutions.244 Studies have demonstrated that the certainty provided
by quantified water rights can lead to sustainability, improved economic
reliability, and use of water to the fullest extent possible, consistent with
California’s fundamental water policy.245
2. Texas
To the extent that the Texas rule of capture applicable to groundwater
actually bestows unlimited pumping rights, then quantification appears to
conflict with Texas law.246 Closer examination, however, reveals that there
is no conflict, because quantification is a natural corollary of an inherent limit
on the quantity of the resource available for distribution, and not a doctrinal
rule about who gets how much in distribution of the resource. Moreover,
characterization of pumping rights as unlimited stems from interpretation of
concepts that benefit from close examination. The term absolute in “absolute
ownership,” for example, might refer to a fee simple absolute interest in real
property and its associated water right, rather than an absolute right to pump
until the basin is entirely drained.247 In other words, it could be that
landowners possess full ownership interests in the water available to their
property, rather than a more limited usufructuary interest, easement, or
license.248 Thus it is possible for a property right in water to be “absolute”
but still limited by physical availability and an inherent duty to protect the
core of the common pool resource.
Similarly, the rule of capture, properly understood, might function
primarily as a rule of no liability for pumping as against immediately
neighboring property owners; a functionality arguably present in the facts of
the foundational cases in which the rule has been applied.249 In those cases,
the issues seem to revolve around the extent of obligation (or more precisely
lack thereof) to a neighbor or other individual user, and not around the
breadth and depth of an individual’s right to pump.250 None of these cases
explore the character of the property in which the ownership interest is
located, and none include a declaration that the rule of capture embodies a

244. GRAY ET AL., supra note 4.
245. Id.
246. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Sipriano v. Great Spring
Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
247. See generally Drummond et al., supra note 62.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5, at 448–49 (noting that rule of capture cases have “focused
primarily on liability for groundwater use, not ownership of the resource itself”).
250. Id.

2016]

UNLIMITED RIGHTS IN A WATER-SCARCE WORLD?

751

social agreement to destroy a common pool resource.251 The rule of capture
does not appear to have been created to allow landowners to pump with
abandon until they deplete a shared groundwater resource.252 Consistent with
the foregoing, despite continuing rhetoric about unlimited rights to pump,
Texas in fact recognizes various exceptions to unlimited pumping and
prohibits pumping that equates to trespass, malicious conduct, or waste, as
well as pumping that results in contamination or land subsidence.253
Rhetoric aside, Texas law already recognizes the reality of the common
pool.254 The legislature has declared that conservation of groundwater
resources is required to fulfill the will of the people of Texas as expressed in
the state constitution, which in turn declares conservation for present and
future generations to be a public right and duty.255 The reality of inherent
limits and the tool of quantification reflect and further these declarations, and
thus, should be integrated into judicial determinations regarding the scope of
rights to groundwater.
E. Quantification Does Not Require Inflexible Management
If a sustainability limit is inherent in common pool resources, as argued
here, it does not necessarily follow that management to protect the common
pool must be inflexible. In those basins in which sustainable yield is sought
(or groundwater mining is prohibited) today, the rules do not typically treat
drawdown that would be unsustainable over the long-term as per se unlawful
on an annual basis; instead, pumpers may be allowed to exceed sustainable
limits in a specific period in order to protect certain economic and other

251. Id.
252. See Drummond et al., supra note 62 (explaining the various exceptions to the general rule of no
liability).
253. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., concurring)
(stating that the common law rule of capture “entitles a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of
groundwater”); e.g., WYTHE, supra note 87; Texas Water Law, supra note 72.
254. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.)
(stating that Texas conservation districts shall “consider the public interest in conservation, preservation,
protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their
subdivisions, and in controlling subsidence caused by withdrawal of groundwater from those groundwater
reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article XVI, Texas
Constitution”).
The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State . . . including the
control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters, the waters of its
rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other useful purposes, the reclamation and
irrigation of its arid, semi-arid and other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage
of its overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and development
of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation of its inland and coastal waters,
and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all
hereby declared public rights and duties . . . .
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
255. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); TEX. WATER § 36.101(a)(4).
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interests.256 The sustainability limit imposes a duty to not pass the “tipping
point,” or to otherwise allow pumping to result in unacceptable wasting or
destruction of the common pool resource.257 Thus, recognition of an inherent
limit on pumping can coexist with sensitivity to local exigencies, allowing
for flexible management while protecting the resource in the long-term.
F. Quantification Should Happen at the Local Level
To ensure appropriately flexible management and responsiveness to
place-based concerns, quantification should happen at the local level. Both
Texas and California have embraced the local model of groundwater
management. Texas created groundwater conservation districts that develop
management plans and rules for specific regions.258 California, for its part,
recently confirmed a longstanding local management philosophy by
choosing local agencies as the guardians of sustainability on a statewide
basis.259 California’s Water Code directs that “groundwater sustainability
agencies” will be made up of one or more existing local water institutions or
new local entities created for that purpose.260 Sustainability plans will focus
on the regional and local groundwater resource, and local institutions are
tasked with development of solutions.261 Under California law, the state
government has little role to play unless and until the locals fail to meet a
mandatory standard, and even then the state thus far seems to be committed
to local solutions where possible.262
In both states, approaches to groundwater management reflect a
recognition that locally developed rules and local solutions are a core feature
of endurable institutions for management of a common pool
resource.263 Local action tends to be more politically palatable to
256. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 297–98.
257. See DAN A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 6.15 (2000). Colorado, New
Mexico, and Oklahoma have expressly adopted tables that allow for managed exceedance of safe yield,
not to exceed a tipping point to total exhaustion. Id.
258. See TEX. WATER §§ 36.0011–.012 (groundwater conservation districts).
259. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.) (“In enacting this part, it is the intent of the Legislature to do all of the
following: . . . [t]o enhance local management of groundwater consistent with rights to use or store
groundwater and Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution.”); id. § 10720.1(d) (“To provide
local groundwater agencies with the authority and the technical and financial assistance necessary to
sustainably manage groundwater.”); id. § 10720.1(h) (“To manage groundwater basins through the actions
of local governmental agencies to the greatest extent feasible, while minimizing state intervention to only
when necessary to ensure that local agencies manage groundwater in a sustainable manner.”); see also
City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“There is no statewide
system for allocating rights in groundwater. The Legislature has left that to local government or, as here,
to adjudication by the courts.” (citing O.W.L. Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008))).
260. CAL. WATER § 10721(j).
261. Id. § 10721(v).
262. See id. § 70210.
263. OSTROM, supra note 20.
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groundwater rights holders than state regulation. Local rules reflect the
particular conditions of the particular resource,264 leaving the most room for
flexible management that integrates the rights and needs of individual water
users while still protecting the common resource. Quantification and
subsequent management should happen at the local level, provided that the
local process respects the rights of all groundwater users, including
disadvantaged communities, and considers impacts upon dependent
ecosystems.
G. Addressing Objections: Law, Economics, Technology, and Cost
In any given basin, there are several potential reasons why groundwater
rights have not been quantified. First, property owners maintain that the right
cannot be legally quantified.265 Second, property owners take a political
stance against quantification because they fear that this path leads to
substantial reduction in economic value.266 Third, quantification is
conceptually and technically difficult.267 Each of these reasons is addressed
below.
As explained in this Article, the first objection is based on an incorrect
understanding of the law. There is no such thing as an unlimited property
right to a common pool depletable resource.268 Unlimited property rights lead
to depletion, and there is no property right to permanently deplete a natural
resource that serves health and safety interests as well as critical economic
and environmental interests.269 It is true that a property owner may have a
right to a share of the scarce or dwindling supplies, but this right is not
unlimited and cannot push the resource past its tipping point.270
Quantification of rights to groundwater is essential to ensure the continued
viability of the common pool resource.
The second objection is also misplaced. In heavily pumped basins,
quantification will actually improve the real (as opposed to imagined) value
of the water right for several reasons. First, a depleted basin provides no
water. Second, in a depleting basin, dormant property owners that do not
hold quantified rights are at significant risk of existing users developing a

264. Id.; see also Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1514 (1984)
(describing the relationship between geography and development of water rights doctrines in different
areas of the U.S.).
265. See, e.g., Gies, supra note 3.
266. See id.
267. E.g., JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH & KRISTYN ABHOLD, MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: SETTING
MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
7–15 (2015), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/measuring-what-matters-california
-sustainable-groundwater-report.pdf.
268. Arnold, supra note 10.
269. See supra Part III.C.1.
270. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 99.
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reliance on their supply that cannot practically be overcome.271 Quantifying
the rights puts everyone on notice that rights may be claimed in the future,
and helps users to understand how much should be invested in alternative
supplies as part of a resilient water supply portfolio. Third, quantification of
an inchoate, land-based right informs the property owner about data critical
to rational choices about future investments: i.e., the property owner will
know how much water the property will actually be able to access in the
future versus an ambiguous, rhetorical claim to water that likely will not exist
in the future.272 Quantification makes the right more valuable, not less.273
The third objection is easily addressed from a technical standpoint: what
we could not previously do, we can do today.274 A more pointed criticism
focuses on costs associated with employing quantification methods and
technologies. Cost is an important constraint—indeed, it is arguably the key
constraint—and it is critical to be sensitive to how cost affects groundwater
users and groundwater managers. That said, a consideration of costs should
encompass all factors, including the opportunity costs of uncertain supply
and unpredictable rights; costs associated with depleted groundwater, poor
water quality, subsidence, and other adverse effects of uncertain and
unregulated pumping; the cost of substitute supplies, and re-integration of
externalities imposed on others. In many basins, groundwater levels have
declined to the point that the cost of doing nothing has become unacceptably
high; in those basins, quantification of pumping rights and data-driven
management is imperative.275

271. See supra Part II.C.4.
272. See OSTROM, supra note 20.
273. Griggs, supra note 185, at 1317. “[W]ithout a definite and reliable quantification of both the
groundwater right and the water supply on which it depends, there can be little reliance upon it as a
property right and little predictability in its regulation.” Id.; see also Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of
Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 666 (Cal. 1979).
Uncertainty concerning the rights of water users has pernicious effects. Initially, it inhibits
long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters in a stream
system. . . . “[Dormant] rights constitute the main threat to nonriparian and out-of-watershed
development, they are the principal cause of insecurity of existing riparian uses, and their
presence adds greatly to the cost of obtaining firm water rights under a riparian system. They
are unrecorded, their quantity is unknown, their administration in the courts provides very little
opportunity for control in the public interest. To the extent that they may deter others from
using the water for fear of their ultimate exercise, they are wasteful, in the sense of costing the
economy the benefits lost from the deterred uses.”
In re Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 666 (quoting Frank Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin
Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 302, 318 (1957)).
274. See generally CHRISTIAN-SMITH & ABHOLD, supra note 267 (reviewing the state of knowledge
regarding quantitative management of groundwater basins).
275. E.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, A Texan Tragedy: Ample Oil, No Water, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2013,
10:07 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/11/texas-tragedy-ample-oil-no-water;
Julia Lurie, California’s Drought Is So Bad That Thousands Are Living Without Running Water, MOTHER
JONES (July 31, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/07/drought-5000californians-dont-have-running-water.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the framework and rules for groundwater rights in California
and Texas are quite different, the systems share a commonality: In each,
private ownership interests are necessarily shaped and defined by the nature
of groundwater as a depletable common pool resource. Given this reality,
the concept of unlimited rights is both physically and legally impossible.276
Unlimited rights are also undesirable because unlimited rights create
uncertainty and ambiguity that ultimately, and ironically, impair the value of
the land-based right to groundwater.
Property owners who hold rights to groundwater should embrace
quantification as a means of protecting their rights. Accepting quantification,
however, does not mean accepting less than one’s fair share of water
associated with a property right. The question of how much future water is
fairly assigned to any particular property owner in light of the capacity of the
basin and other rights is a separate question, to be addressed in the
quantification process.

276. Griggs, supra note 185, at 1317 (describing how quantification protects the property interest in
water and noting that “[t]his is not a doctrinal matter”).

